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Abstract. To meet the availability target and reduce system downtime, effective maintenance 
have a great importance. However, maintenance performance is greatly affected in complex 
ways by human factors. Hence, to have an effective maintenance operation, these factors needs 
to be assessed and quantified. To avoid the inadequacies of traditional human error assessment 
(HEA) approaches, the application of Bayesian Networks (BN) is gaining popularity. The main 
purpose of this paper is to propose a HEA framework based on the BN for maintenance 
operation. The proposed framework aids for assessing the effects of human performance 
influencing factors on the likelihood of human error during maintenance activities. Further, the 
paper investigates how operational issues must be considered in system failure-rate analysis, 
maintenance planning, and prediction of human error in pre- and post-maintenance operations. 
The goal is to assess how performance monitoring and evaluation of human factors can effect 
better operation and maintenance.    
1. Introduction 
To meet the availability target and reduce system downtime, effective maintenance operation have a 
great importance. Maintenance performance is greatly affected in complex ways by human factors, since 
these factors play an important role in the pre- and post-maintenance operations [1, 2]. Further, there are 
several factors, which influences human error, such as internal (psychological and physiological) or 
external (technological and social) human performance shaping factors [2-4]. Therefore, in order to have 
an effective maintenance operation, these factors needs to be assessed and quantified. Further, all factors 
affecting human performance must be recognized and quantified throughout the various phases of the 
maintenance operation. The evaluations of these factors can help to have an effective maintenance 
operation with high level of safety.  
Human factors analysis is rooted in the concept that the frequency and consequences of human errors 
are related to the maintenance work environment, culture, and maintenance procedures. This can be 
accounted for in the design of equipment, structures, maintenance processes and procedures. In general, 
the human error analysis concentrates on the effects of human performance on the maintenance 
operation, recognising that pre- and post-maintenance operations are influenced by human actions. To 
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evaluate the risk of human error during maintenance activities, several studies have been carried out; 
see e.g. Apostolakis, et al. [5], Noroozi, et al. [1], Deacon, et al. [6], Noroozi, et al. [7], and Khan, et al. 
[8]. For instance, Noroozi, et al. [1] proposed a risk-based methodology for pre- and post-
maintenance and, illustrated how to calculate the human error probabilities (HEP) for both maintenance 
activity. Apostolakis, et al. [5] critically reviewed the human cognitive reliability (HCR) and the success 
likelihood index methodology–multiattribute utility decomposition (SLIM-MAUD) model. 
For a long time, traditional HEA strategies have been preoccupied with estimating the frequency of 
an undesirable event and its magnitude to give an overall measure of human error or risk. This type of 
human error or risk measure is quite useful for prioritising risks (the larger the number, the greater the 
risk); however, it is normally impractical and can be irrational when applied blindly [9]. One immediate 
problem with expressing the risk as a product of frequency and consequence is that, usually, one cannot 
directly obtain the numbers needed to calculate the risk without complete knowledge of the relation 
between the causes and effects of risk of events [10]. Hence, to avoid the inadequacies of traditional 
human error assessment approaches and to provide solutions to the problems mentioned above, the 
application of BN is gaining popularity and has been discussed in several pieces of the literature; see 
e.g. Fenton and Neil [9], Røed, et al. [10], Ayele, et al. [11] and Lee and Lee [12]. BNs are particularly 
useful in the HEA of maintenance activities, as they allow us to understand the causal relationship as 
well as combine any historical data that is available with qualitative data and subjective judgements 
about the risk of events.  
Most of the conventional BN based risk assessment approaches are, however, broad, holistic, 
practical guides or roadmaps, developed for off-the-shelf nuclear systems, for non-maintenance 
operations. Moreover, current issues regarding the traditional HEA methodologies are lack of an explicit 
causal model linking observed behaviour to personal and situational factors–theoretical &empirical 
basis; lack of consistency or reproducibility; lack of traceability/ transparency; and variability in results 
[2]. Furthermore, there is a lack of causal methodology to quantify the HEPs of maintenance activities. 
A BN model offers a way to use both limited data and expert judgment to estimate HEPs. Data can be 
used to inform both the BN structure and the BN quantification. 
The main purpose of this paper is thus to propose a BN based HEA (BNB-HEA) framework for 
maintenance operation. The proposed framework can help to assess the effects of human performance 
influencing factors (PIFs) on the likelihood of human error during maintenance activities. Further, this 
paper investigate how operational issues must be considered in system failure-rate analysis, maintenance 
planning, as well as prediction of human error in pre- and post-maintenance operations. The goal is to 
assess how performance monitoring and evaluation of human factors can effect better operation and 
maintenance.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The basic concepts of static BN are described in Section 
2. Thereafter, the proposed BNB-HEA framework for maintenance activities is presented in Section 3. 
Finally, some concluding remarks are presented in Section 4.     
In this paper, human error (HE) is taken to mean the failure to implement a definite task (or 
performance of a not allowed action) that could result in disruption of planned tasks or damage to 
equipment and property. The human error with which this paper is concerned are all in some way related 
to 'maintenance activity'. They are the actual or potential threat of adverse effect of inadequate training 
and skill, poor maintenance instructions and operating procedures, poor work layout, poor equipment 
design and improper work tools [13]. Further, risk is roughly considered as a function of the probability 
of particular occurrences and, the expected losses (lives lost, persons injured, damage to property, and 
disruption of economic activity) caused by a particular phenomenon [14, 15].   
2. Bayesian network – a bird’s eye view 
Static BN are a probabilistic graphical model consists of a qualitative part, an acyclic directed graph 
(DAG), where the nodes represent random variables and a quantitative part, a set of conditional 
probability functions [16]. The nodes can be discrete or continuous, and may or may not be observable 
and the arcs (from parent to child) represent the conditional dependencies or the cause-effect 
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relationships among the variables [16]. Parent nodes are nodes with links pointing towards the child 
nodes. Nodes that are not connected represent variables, which are conditionally independent of each 
other. Further, when BN contain discrete and continuous variables (nodes) generally it is called a Hybrid 
BN. 
The quantitative part of a BN structure can be represented as a product of conditional distribution of 
each node Ni given its parents nodes 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖). Each node is described by the conditional probability 
function of that variable. Then, the joint probability distributions, considering discrete variable, can be 
expressed as:       
Pr(𝑁𝑁1,𝑁𝑁2, … ,𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀) = ∏ Pr (𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖|𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖))𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖                                         (1) 
where: Pr (𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖|𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖) is the conditional distribution mass function of node, 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖. 
Moreover, to understand the complex interaction between PIFs and estimate the consequence of 
human error, a causal approach can be used. Figure 1 illustrates the causal relationships between a 








Figure 1. Causal relationships between a human error and other main events. 
 𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻 denotes a set of any initiating (trigger) events, which are the performance influencing factors and 𝑪𝑪 denotes the control 
measure, such as barriers. 𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯 denotes the main risk event – human error, which shows that the cause of the trigger 𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻 
produces the effect 𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯. 𝑸𝑸 denotes the consequence of the human error. 𝑴𝑴 denotes the mitigating event that prevents any 
cause of 𝑸𝑸, such as any response that avoids or reduces the consequence event. 
  In the causal relationships, a human error, which is an event can be characterised by causal chain 
involving [9]:  
• The event itself (i.e. the error),  
• At least one consequence event that characterizes the impact,  
• One or more initiating (trigger) events, 
• One or more control events, which can stop the trigger event, and  
• One or more mitigating events, which avoid or reduce the consequence event. 
3. Proposed BNB-HEA framework  
The proposed BNB-HEA framework consists of two parts: qualitative and quantitative. The main aim 
of qualitative part is to investigate the interaction of the predominant PIFs and their negative synergy 
effect on the maintenance activities. On the other hand, the focus of quantitative part is to estimate the 
posterior probabilities of the human error and, quantify the risk by employing causal analysis, i.e. BN.  
3.1. Qualitative assessment  
Figure 2 illustrates specific steps that should be followed to construct the BN for maintenance operations 
and, to estimate the main query – the posterior probability of the human error. 
Step 1.1 – Define the problem and perform evaluation of human PIFs: The purpose the initial stage 
of the proposed framework is to study and investigate the effect of the predominant PIFs on the pro- and 
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post– maintenance activities. Further, the interaction of the PIFs, the dependability of these factors on 
various variables, their negative synergy effect on the human perfomance needs to be assessed and 
specified. During this process, the consultation of all relevant stakeholders should be corroborated. 
Step 1.2 – Perform classification of the maintenance task: In the next step, the assessment of the main 
repair or maintenance tasks during system failure should be carried out. For instance, the repair or 
maintenance tasks during gearbox failure are as follows:  
Define the problem & perform evaluation of 
human performance influencing factors
Perform classification of the maintenance 
task
- Disssembly
- Measurement & inspection
- Assembly & installation
- Testing & final inspection 
- Standards & regulations
- Recommended guidelines 
- Company goals & criteria
- Experts’ opinion
- Past experience, etc.   
Perform evaluation of the causal 
dependencies between the main variables
Construct a BN structure Domain expert knowledge 
 
Figure 2. Qualitative part of the proposed BNB-HEA 
• Disassembly of gear box;  
• Measurement and inspection; 
• Corrective maintenance;  
• Assembly and installation; and  
• Testing and final inspection. 
Step 1.3 – Perform evaluation of the causal dependencies between the main variables: In the next 
stage, the interactions or causal dependencies between the main variables, i.e. the PIFs, maintenace 
operation, and the human error, needs to be understood and then the structure of the BN has to be decided. 
In general, BNs can be used for three kinds of reasoning [17]: i) causal reasoning – from known causes 
to unknown effects, ii) diagnostic reasoning – from known effects to unknown causes, and iii) a 
combination of casual and diagnostic reasoning.  
Step 1.4 – Construct a BN structure: The final stage in the qualitative evaluation is to construct the 
BN. Intrinsically, the static BN is a solution for estimating the potential human error probabilities with 
maintenance operations. The main aim of this step is thus to build the Bayesian structure that captures 
the main variables, which comprises both discrete and continuous variables. During this stage, the key is 
to focus on the causal relationships between the main variables.  
3.2. Quantitative assessment  
Figure 3 describes the quantitative part of the proposed BNB-HEA framework and, illustrates the 
specific steps that should be followed to determine the posterior probability of the human error.  
Step 2.1 – Define the state of the discrete nodes: The first step in the quantitative assessment is to 
define the state of each discrete node. A discrete node (variable) is one with a well-defined finite set of 
possible values, called states [18]. The state can take binary values (such as true  or false) or ordered 
values (such as low, medium, or high) [19]. 
Step 2.2 – Assign MPT for each root discrete  node and CPT for other discrete nodes: After 
specifying the states of discrete nodes, then the next step is to quantify the relationships between the 
connected nodes (variables). In this step, marginal probabilities of each root nodes should be assigned. 
For other discrete node (other than the root nodes), conditional probability tables (CPT’s) needs to be 
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defined. For each particular discrete node, all possible combinations of values of those parent nodes 
needs to be observed; and such combination is called instantiation of the parent [19]. For a Boolean 
network, for instance, a variable with n parents requires a CPT with 2n+1 probabilities [19]. These 
probabilities can be estimated or assigned using direct elicitation and/ or machine-learning techniques 
[19]. 
Define the state of the discrete nodes
- Direct (expert) elicitation techniques 
- Machine–learning techniques, etc. 
Assign MPT for each root discrete  node and CPT 
for other discrete nodes
Calculate the discretized CPD of each continuous 
node
Perform  inference  to estimate the posterior 










Select prior probability function (distribution) for 
the selected system    
Construct the likelihood function based on human 
error rate and PIFs data
 
Figure 3. Quantitative part of the proposed BNB-HEA 
Step 2.3 – Calculate the discretized CPD of each continuous node: The next stage is defining the 
conditional probability distributions (CPD’s) for each continuous variable. A continuous variable (node) 
is one which can take on a value between any other two values [18]. Typically, there are two approaches 
to handle the continuous variable: static and dynamic discretization. Both approaches try to specify the 
states of the continuous nodes. Basically, a static discretization requires the breakup of the total range of 
the continuous variable into a number of intervals [18]. However, this process is cumbersome and error 
prone, and where a model contains numerical nodes having a potentially large range, results are 
necessarily only crude approximations [16]. To overcome this problem, the dynamic discretization has 
been developed,  by Neil, et al. [20].  
Step 2.4 – Select prior probability function (distribution) for the selected system: In this stage, a prior 
probability function or distribution needs to be asserted, for the defined system or component. This 
function is the representation of the failure rate of the system or component; and failure rate is the measure 
of frequency of system or component failure. The prior function describes the probability of n or fewer 
failures during a time interval of (0, 𝑝𝑝), when all PIFs are equal to zero or absent (i.e. ‘‘ideal’’ operating 
environment), during maintenance operations. For instance, by assuming that the components fail 






𝑖𝑖=0 e(−𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆)               (2)    
where 𝑃𝑃�𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓� is the probability of 𝑝𝑝 or fewer failures and 𝜆𝜆 is a failure rate of the system/ component. 
Step 2.5 – Construct the likelihood function based on human error rate and PIFs data: After defining 
the prior probability function and observing the PIFs data, then the likelihood function has to be 
constructed. Likelihood function generally is the joint probability function and, it can be expressed as a 
product of conditional probabilities [21]. Hence, by considering discrete PIFs, the likelihood function of 
the system failure, based on Glickman and van Dyk [21] approach, can be expressed as follows: 
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𝐿𝐿�𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓�𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝� = 𝑝𝑝(𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝1,𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝2, … ,𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟−1,𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟|𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓)            (3) 
where 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝1,𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝2, … ,𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟−1,𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 is a set of PIFs or triggers. 
Then, by grouping the PIFs into vectors of size R, (3), can be re-written as follows:  
𝐿𝐿�𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓�𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝� = ∏ 𝑝𝑝(𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖|𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓)𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖=1              (4) 
where 𝑀𝑀 is a vector of size.  
By following the same approach, the likelihood function of the human error can be expressed as, by 
considering the discrete PIFs variables:  
𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻|𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝) = ∏ 𝑝𝑝(𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖|𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖=1              (5) 
where 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 is representing the human error. 
Step 2.6 – Perform  inference  to estimate the posterior probabilities of the human error: The final 
stage is to perform inference for estimating the posterior probabilities of the human error. Probabilistic 
inference is the task of computing the probability of each node in BN, according to the most recent PIFs 
to provide posterior probabilities. The posterior distribution combines prior PIFs information with actual 
observed data to predict the future potential human error probabilities. That means the current 
information about the PIFs will be used to continuously update the potential human error relating to 
maintenance activity. Simply, the distribution describes the probability that the error will occur, given 
the predominant PIFs has observed. The posterior distribution of the human error, considering discrete 
PIFs (variables), based on Glickman and van Dyk [21] approach, can be expressed as:  
𝑃𝑃(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻|𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝) = 𝑃𝑃(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝑃𝑃(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻|𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟)
∫𝑝𝑝(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝑝𝑝(𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟|𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
                                   (6) 
 




∝ 𝑃𝑃(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻|𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝)                                       (7) 
To solve, Equation (6) and Equation (7), we can first multiply the prior distribution by the likelihood, 
and then determine the marginal constant that forces the expression to integrate to 1.  
4. Concluding remarks  
This work introduced a framework for a human error assessment of maintenance activities based on BN. 
The methodology consists of two parts: qualitative and quantitative. The qualitative analysis involves 
the following steps:  
(i) evaluation of the PIFs (to investigate the influence of the PIFs on the maintenance),  
(ii) performing maintenance task identification (to investigate the main repair or maintenance 
tasks),  
(iii) evaluating the causal dependencies between the main variables (to understand the 
interactions between the main variables), and  
(iv) constructing a BN structure.  
The quantitative part illustrates the specific steps that should be followed to estimate the posterior 
probability of the human error and involves the following steps: (i) defining the state of each discrete 
node, (ii) assigning a MPT for root discrete nodes and a CPT for other discrete nodes, (iii) calculating 
the discretized CPD of each continuous node, (iv) selecting the prior probability distribution for the 
selected system, (v) constructing the likelihood function, based on the system failure rate data, (vi) 
computing the posterior distribution or probabilistic inference. 
The findings are as follows: 
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• The proposed BNB-HEA framework is beneficial as it outlines a set of steps that assist the 
maintenance manager to estimate the probabilities of the human error due to the negative 
impact of performance influencing factors.  
• By employing the proposed BNB-HEA framework, decision maker can analyse different 




BN Bayesian networks  
HE  Human error 
HEA Human error assessment 
HEPs Human error probabilities  
HCR Human cognitive reliability  
SLIM-MAUD Success likelihood index methodology–multiattribute utility 
decomposition  
BNB-HEA Bayesian networks based human error assessment 
PIFs  Performance influencing factors 
Pr (𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖|𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖) The conditional distribution mass function of node, 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖. 
𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 Conditional distribution of a node i 
𝑃𝑃�𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓� The probability of n or fewer failures 
𝜆𝜆 Failure rate of the system/ component. 
𝐿𝐿�𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓�𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝� Likelihood function of the system failure, 
𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝1,𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝2, … ,𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟−1,𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 A set of PIFs. 
𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻|𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝) Likelihood function of the human error 
𝑃𝑃(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻|𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝) Posterior distribution of the human error 
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